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DOES PEACE HAVE A CHANCE? 
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
AS THE FOUNDATION FOR lASTING 
PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
CHRISTOPHER A. CALLANAN* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
She would later tell her story to reporters, identifYing herself only 
as "Sharon."! She had spent a Saturday night in her father's bar in 
Greysteel, Northern Ireland, which at the time probably did not seem 
in any way out of the ordinary.2 Perhaps Sharon noticed only that the 
Rising Sun was particularly "packed" that night. 3 However, it was the 
night before Halloween, so the crowd of about sixty likely seemed 
appropriate for the occasion.4 
Unfortunately, nothing could have prepared Sharon for this par-
ticular Saturday night. She would later describe the horror when two 
masked gunmen entered the Rising Sun:5 "One said 'Trick or treat.' 
Then they shot everyone .... There was nothing anyone could do but 
lie down and hope they weren't hit."6 Seven people were killed and 
eleven others were wounded after the gunmen, bearing automatic 
weapons, "calmly reload[ed] their weapons ... [and] sprayed the 
packed pub before fleeing."7 Sharon's grandfather, who was eighty-two, 
was among those killed.s 
For too long, Northern Ireland has been plagued by violence.9 In 
addition, the violence has stretched south to the Republic of Ireland 
and across the sea to Great Britain. This Note argues that the violence 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL 
1 Protestants Kill 7 in Ulster Pub, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1993, at 2 . 
2Id. 
3 Jim Campbell, Ulster Police Vow to Find Gunmen Who Killed 7, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1, 1993, 
at 2. 
4 See Protestants Kill 7 in Ulster Pub, supra note 1, at 2. 
5Id. 
6Id. 
7 See Campbell, supra note 3, at 2. 
8 See Protestants Kill 7 in Ulster Pub, supra note 1, at 2. "The Greysteel slaughter horrified a 
province hardened to violence. People brought flowers to the pub in tribute. One carried a card 
reading, 'God might forgive them, but we can't.'" Campbell, supra note 3, at 2. 
9 Paul Bew & Gordon Gillespie, NORTHERN IRELAND: A CHRONOLOGY OF THE TROUBLES: 
1968-1993, at v (1993). 
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in Northern Ireland is the catastrophic product of Ireland's failure to 
protect its minorities. Irish history reveals that those in power have 
repeatedly abused their power to oppress the minority. This inspires 
minority groups to rebellion, which when successful leads the formerly 
dispossessed to exploit those now in the minority. Ireland has yet to 
establish a society of harmonious diversity. 
This Note demonstrates how the protection of minorities is essen-
tial to establishing a stable community in Ireland. Part II examines 
Ireland's past, which is filled with examples of the oppression of mi-
norities and violent rebellion. Part III traces the recent progress in 
Northern Ireland and demonstrates that despite major progress, Ire-
land must address its failure to protect minorities to ensure lasting 
progress. Finally, Part IV attempts to suggest a way for both the majority 
and minority to bridge the gap which has separated them and to form 
a unified stable society. 
II. THE PAST 
A. Historical Background 
Today, Ireland covers thirty-two thousand square miles and in-
cludes five million people. lO However, the island is divided politically 
between the twenty-six counties of Ireland and the six northeastern 
counties which remain part of Great BritainY The island's political 
partition is the modern legacy of an age-old Irish struggle to be free 
from Great Britain.12 This historic struggle has left a geographically 
divided island as well as a deeply divided Irish people.13 
At its most obvious level, the conflict within Northern Ireland pits 
more than one million Protestants who prefer to maintain a union with 
Id. 
For a quarter of a century Northern Ireland has been locked in a bitter conflict 
centered around a constitutional dispute in which the majority of the population 
wish to remain within the United Kingdom and a minority would prefer that 
Northern Ireland was incorporated within the Republic of Ireland. Already over 
3,000 people have lost their lives due to political violence in a small territory 
inhabited by only one and a half million people; worse, there is no end in sight. 
10 E.g., MICHAEL FORDE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF IRELAND 1 (1987). 
11 E.g., TIMOTHY P. COOGAN, IRELAND SINCE THE RiSING xi (1966) [hereinafter SINCE THE 
RiSING]. 
12 See e.g., F.S.L. LYONS, IRELAND SINCE THE FAMINE 3 (1971). Lyons discusses Ireland's 
"national demand ... to break the connection with England, the never-failing source of our 
political evils." Id. 
13YINCENT J.D. RYAN, IRELAND RESTORED: THE NEW SELF-DETERMINATION 291 (1991). 
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Great Britain against the one-half million Catholics who prefer some 
association with Ireland. I4 The one-half million Catholics, who are 
ethnically Irish, consider themselves part of an independent and united 
Irish nation unjustly divided by partition. I5 They are called nationalists 
or republicans because they support the nationalist aim of an all-Irish 
republic. I6 The million-plus Protestants regard themselves as ethnically 
BritishI7 and are called unionists or loyalists because they support a 
continued union with Great Britain. I8 The intricate relationship be-
tween Protestants and Catholics has developed gradually over time and 
is best understood in its historical context. 
Under the Act of Union of 1800, Ireland became part of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. I9 The Union resulted 
in direct rule of Ireland from Westminster and was intended to last 
forever. 2o Under the Act of Union, Ireland lacked a strong voice in the 
Westminster Parliament, suffered widespread poverty, and endured the 
human catastrophe of the Great Famine.21 Not only did the Famine 
cost two million lives22 and prompt a mass exodus of Irish people that 
14 E.g., PADRAIG O'MALLEY, THE UNCIVIL WARS: IRELAND TODAY 10 (1990). O'Malley terms 
this the arithmetic of impasse: 
Id. 
The number of Catholics in Northern Ireland is too great for Protestants to impose 
their will unilaterally within a stable political structure in Northern Ireland, while 
the number of Protestants in Ireland as a whole is too great for Catholics to impose 
their will within a stable political framework in Ireland as a whole. Either situation 
is subject to the tyranny of the minority. 
15 E.g., id. at 9-10. 
16 E.g., id. 
17 H.D.S. Greenway, For Northern Ireland's Protestants, an Identity Crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 
4, 1993, at 2l. 
18 E.g., O'MALLEY, supra note 14, at9. Northern Ireland's Protestant community suffers from 
a particularly unenviable identity crisis, being neither Irish nor British. An article in the Boston 
Globe explains, "Ian Paisley Jr., the son of the firebreathing [sic] and immoderate Protestant 
leader, said: 'When I go to London I am just another Paddy'-despite the fact that he is from a 
separate tradition and culture from the rest of Ireland. 'When I get back home, I am not really 
British, either.'" Greenway, supra note 17, at 2l. 
19 E.g., FORDE, supra note 10, at 1-2. 
20 E.g., id. at 2. Article 1 of the Act of Union announced that from "1 January 1801, 'and for 
ever,' the Kingdom of Ireland and the Kingdom of Great Britain 'shall be ... united into one 
kingdom ... .'" Id. 
21 E.g., COOGAN, SINCE THE RrSING, supra note 11, at 2-3. 
22 E.g., id. at 3. "The population of Ireland in 1785 is reckoned to have been about 4 million; 
in 1831 it was 7,767,101; ten years later it had risen to 8,175,124; but by 1851 it had fallen 
dramatically to 6,200,000. (In 1964, North and South added together, it was 4,243,383.)" Id. at 3. 
Compare these figures with today's population of five million. See FORDE, supra note 10, at l. 
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continues today,23 but it also planted the seeds of animosity toward 
Great Britain in many Irish minds.24 
The widespread poverty, human tragedy, and lack of political voice 
which Ireland suffered under the Act of Union inspired a constitu-
tional movement in Ireland for the Act's repeal.25 The movement 
sought to free Ireland from British control and to create an inde-
pendent and united Ireland characterized by uniquely Irish culture 
and values.26 This was termed the Home Rule movement.27 The Home 
Rule movement led to the Easter Rising of 1916, a botched revolt led 
by Irish nationalists who saw an opportunity to free Ireland while the 
British were preoccupied with Germany.28 The Rising was a secret affair 
that failed because of a miscue regarding a shipment of arms from 
Germany, and because of a greatly outnumbered Irish contingent.29 
Although the Rising had little popular backing, the public execution 
of its leaders by the British government galvanized public opinion in 
widespread support of an independent Ireland.30 
23 E.g., COOGAN, SINCE THE RISING, supra note 11, at 3. Coogan credits the Famine with 
starting the exodus which created the powerful Irish political influence in America. See id. 
24 E.g., id. The Famine "strengthened and embittered with hate for England the radical 
proponents of Irish nationalism." Id.; see also LYONS, supra note 12, at 4. For Lyons, the "most 
profound" impact of the Famine on Irish history "lay in its ultimate psychological legacy: 
Id. 
Expressed in its simplest terms, this legacy was that the long-standing and deep-
rooted hatred of the English connection was given not only a new intensity, but also 
dimension .... [Tlhis hatred, this bitterness, this resentment were carried over-
seas, and especially to America, by nearly four million Irish men, women and 
children who left their homeland, decade by decade and year by year in the 
half-century after the Famine. The political consequences of this unending exodus 
of a permanently antagonized population were literally incalculable. 
25 See e.g., TIM PAT COOGAN, THE IRA: A HISTORY 5 (1993) [hereinafter IRAl. See also 
LYONS, supra note 12, at 5 (1970). 
26 See e.g., COOGAN, SINCE THE RISING, supra note 11, at 2-5. 
27Id. at 8-21. The 1916 Rising was led principally by Patrick Pearse, Sean MacDermott,James 
Connolly, Thomas Clarke, Thomas MacDonagh, Eamonn Ceanny, and Joseph Plunkett. The 
rebels managed to secure several strong points in Dublin including the General Post Office. On 
the steps of the General Post Office, the rebels issued a proclamation to the people of Ireland 
announcing the freedom of Ireland (North and South) and calling themselves the Provisional 
Government. See generaUy id. at 1-21. 
28Id. at 14. 
29 Id. at 15-18. Coogan notes, "The Rising was less a military venture than a blood-sacrifice 
to the gods of Irish nationalism, unappeased by the ameliorative legislation of recent years and 
the halting steps toward Home Rule." Id. at 16-17. 
30 Id. at 2,18-19; see also JAMES CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw IN IRELAND 4 (1992). 
It was the immediate aftermath of the Rising which changed the climate of opinion. 
The execution of the leaders-particularly of James Connolly ... who had to be 
propped up in a chair to be shot-shocked and embittered countless Irishmen who, 
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Popular support led to the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, 
which provided for two Irish parliaments, one for the north of Ireland 
and one for the rest of the country.31 Each parliament had the power 
to make laws for "peace, order and good government" of the areas 
within itsjurisdiction.32 In addition, the two parliaments had the option 
of merging.33 To nationalist dismay, the parliaments were limited in 
authority.34 For example, defense and foreign affairs were excluded; 
the parliaments' financial powers were limited and the overriding 
authority of Westminster was reaffirmed.35 
Irish nationalists were not satisfied with the devolved government 
under the 1920 Act, and violence continued until the Truce of July 11, 
1921, which spawned the Irish Free State.36 The Irish Free State had 
"the same constitutional status in the Community of Nations known as 
the British Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of 
Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand and the Union of South 
Mrica."37 In 1921, dominion status was vague, but for Irish nationalists, 
a self-governing dominion was progress from the devolution of the 
1920 Act.38 As a dominion, the Irish Free State had nearly complete 
control over domestic affairs, but a degree of colonial subordination 
remained.39 
In seeking independence, Irish nationalists never addressed the 
question of partition, blaming the British for the division of the is-
deploring the Rising, had yet been moved by the courage and patriotic idealism of 
the insurgents. 
COOGAN, SINCE THE RISING, supra note 11, at 2. 
31 See, e.g., CASEY, supra note 30, at 4-5. 
32Id. at 5. 
33 FORDE, supra note 10, at 2. The parliament for the six northeastern counties was known 
as the "Stormont" parliament. Id. 
34CASEY, supra note 30, at 4-5. 
35Id. at 5. The Act provided for each parliament to choose an executive from among its 
ranks. A Council of Ireland was established to be comprised of members of both parliaments. In 
addition, both parliaments could establish a single parliament for the entire island thereby 
abolishing the separate parliaments as well as the Council. Id. 
36Id. at 5--6. 
37Id. at 6. The Act provided that the Irish Free State's parliament "would have the power 'to 
make laws for the peace, order and good government of Ireland.'" Id. In addition, the position 
of the Irish Free State with regard to Westminster was declared analogous to that of Canada. Id. 
38 See id. At this time the specific status of dominions was unclear in international law and 
foreign affairs. Id. at 6-7. 
39Id. Most restrictions dealt with Ireland's sovereignty especially with respect to defense. 
Ireland's defense forces were to maintain the same proportion to Ireland's population as Britain's. 
Nor was Ireland able to establish facilities for wireless communication outside of Ireland without 
British consent. Id. at 7. 
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land.40 The developments which led to the Irish Free State also estab-
lished Northern Ireland as a political entity in its own right.4l As in the 
South, the six northeastern counties received their own parliament 
and control over domestic affairs.42 Thus, two identifiable states were 
created on the island: the six northeastern counties with a local ma-
jority of Protestants and the rest of the island with an overwhelming 
Catholic majority.43 This devolved government of Northern Ireland 
lasted until March 1972, when Great Britain invoked its authority 
under the 1920 Act to suspend the Northern Ireland Parliament due 
to security concerns.44 Great Britain took full control of Northern 
Ireland's affairs as a temporary security measure.45 Direct rule from 
Westminster continues today despite its failure to bring peace and 
stability to the region.46 
For the Irish Free State in the South, constitutional law has estab-
lished a stable community, but has simultaneously widened the gap 
between North and South. In 1922, the South passed the Constitution 
of the Irish Free State.47 Irish nationalists gained an additional degree 
of independence through the 1922 Constitution, which recognized 
Ireland's association with Britain through an oath of allegiance to the 
40 G.w. Hogan, Law and Religion: Church-State Relations in Ireland From Inde-
pendence to the Present Day, 35 AM. J. COMPo L. 47, 48--49 (1987). The Constitution 
of 1922 recognizes Ireland as a Catholic nation, ending the Irish Free State and 
establishing the twenty-six southern counties of Ireland as a separate entity. The 
1937 Constitution, which remains in effect today, expresses the same attitude: "We 
the people of Eire [Ireland], humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our 
Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial ... " 
IR. CONST. pmbl. Hogan comments, "The reference to Jesus Christ sustaining 'our 
fathers through centuries of trial' is a clear reference to the religious persecution 
suffered by Catholics in Ireland in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. One 
might reasonably infer that non-Catholics did not really belong to 'the people of 
Eire.'" Hogan, supra note 40, at 55 n.17. 
41 O'MALLEY, supra note 14, at 4; CASEY, supra note 30, at 4-5. 
42 CASEY, supra note 30, at 4-5. 
43 E.g., Hogan, supra note 40, at 47. 
«O'MALLEY, supra note 14, at 4. The dissolution of the Stormont government brought 
British troops to Northern Ireland. The Downing Street Declaration of August 19, 1969 pro-
claimed: "the British Government have [sic] ultimate responsibility for the protection of those 
who live in Northern Ireland when, as in the past week, a breakdown of law and order has 
occurred." Richard J. Harvey, The Right of the People of the Whole of Ireland to Self-Determination, 
Unity, Sovereignty and Independence, 11 N.Y.L. SCH.]' INT'L & COMPo L. 167, 168 n.4 (1990). 
45 See O'MALLEY, supra note 14, at 4. The Downing Street Declaration of 1969 insisted that 
"troops have been provided on a temporary basis." Harvey, supra note 44, at 168 n.4. 
46 See O'MALLEY, supra note 14, at 4. "Direct Rule had come, and though it was conceived 
of only as a temporary measure, it remains to this day the mode of government, the least 
acceptable alternative." Id. 
47 E.g. CASEY, supra note 30, at 8. 
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Crown, an Office of Governor General, and the right of appeal from 
Irish courts to British courts.48 In addition, Ireland became associated 
with Great Britain for foreign affairs and defense purposes, and recog-
nized the British monarch as the head of that association.49 Although 
it was better than the devolved government of 1920, Irish nationalists 
still felt restrained50 under British control and therefore chipped away 
at the 1922 Constitution's ties to Britain until sixteen amendments had 
been passed.51 The 1922 Constitution was eventually replaced in 1937 
by the Bunreacht na h'Eireann (Constitution of Ireland) which re-
mains in force in the South today.52 
The 1937 Constitution, written by Eamon de Valera,53 was ap-
proved in June 1937.54 De Valera, who participated in the 1916 Rising, 
rose to power atop the powerful wave of nationalist sentiment that 
followed the failed Rising.55 De Valera and fellow Irish nationalists were 
dissatisfied with the remaining elements of British control in the 1922 
Constitution, particularly with its Commonwealth status. 56 The princi-
pal distinction between the 1922 Constitution and the 1937 Constitu-
tion was that the 1937 document made no reference to outside links 
and provided Ireland with its own head of state to be elected by the 
Irish people.57 By removing the symbolic vestiges of British control, the 
48 See FORDE, supra note 10, at 3. 
49 CASEY, supra note 30, at 15. 
50 FORDE, supra note 10, at 3. 
51Id. at 15; see also FORDE, supra note 10, at 3. The amendments altered the mode of election 
of the Senate, enhanced the Senate's power and status, and introduced a wide reaching public 
safety act which, when invoked by executive proclamation, restricted many constitutionally guar-
anteed freedoms. CASEY, supra note 30, at 15. 
52 See CASEY, supra note 30, at 20; see also FORDE, supra note 10, at 3. 
53J.H. WHYTE, CHURCH AND STATE IN MODERN IRELAND: 1923-1970, at 42,51 (1971). See 
also T. RYLE DWYER, DE VALERA: THE MAN & THE MYTHS 196-201 (1991). 
54 WHYTE, supra note 53, at 51-56. 
55 See COOGAN, SINCE THE RISING, supra note 11, at xi, 74. See also supra note 30 and 
accompanying text. De Valera was born in New York in 1882 to a Spanish father and an Irish 
mother. COOGAN, SINCE THE RISING, supra note 11, at 73. After his father's death, de Valera's 
mother and maternal uncle returned to Ireland. Id. De Valera formed the Fianna Fail party which 
entered the Irish Parliament in 1927. Id. De Valera was a devout Catholic who adhered to the 
dream of an independent Irish Catholic nation. See id. De Valera hated partition and once said 
that he would consider it a personal failure if partition was not lifted within his lifetime. Id. De 
Valera was the last commandant to surrender in the 1916 Rising. JOHN BOWMAN, DE VALERA AND 
THE ULSTER QUESTION: 1917-1973, at 6 (1982). He wanted nothing more than to see Ireland 
united, yet his crowning achievement, the 1937 Constitution, remains as a barrier to unity. See id. 
De Valera was spared from execution for his part in the Easter Rising of 1916 only because of 
the public outrage at the executions of his comrades. DWYER, supra note 53, at 17-18. 
56 LYONS, supra note 12, at 53l. See also DAVID G. MORGAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF 
IRELAND: THE LAw OF THE EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATURE AND JUDICATURE 23-24 (2d ed. 1990). 
57WHYTE, supra note 53, at 5l. 
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1937 Constitution realized the nationalist dream of a separate and 
distinctively Irish nation.58 However, some have criticized de Valera's 
over-reaction to the symbols of the 1922 Constitution. Critics have also 
blamed the nationalist desire for independence for not merely break-
ing with Britain, but irreconcilably alienating the six northeastern 
counties of Northern Ireland.59 
Despite this criticism, the 1937 Constitution is in effect today and 
remains one of de Valera's most enduring achievements.6o However, it 
is a remarkably Catholic document, one which reflects the nationalist 
dream not only to separate from Britain but also to create a separate 
and Gaelic Ireland.61 The 1937 Constitution drew heavily from the 
Catholic Social Code, a compendium of Catholic social principles,62 and 
the Constitution espouses Catholic values in its text.63 Article 41 on the 
family, Article 42 on education, and Article 43 on private property all 
reflect Catholic influence.64 
Article 41 provides that: "No law shall be enacted providing for 
the grant of a dissolution of marriage."65 Article 42 limits the State's 
rights in education: ''The State shall not oblige parents in violation of 
their conscience and lawful preference to send their children to schools 
established by the State .... "66 Similarly, Article 43 provides that indi-
vidual property rights should be "regulated by principles of social 
justice. "67 Article 44 on religion explicitly recognizes the superiority of 
Catholicism.68 
58 COOGAN, SINCE THE RISING, supra nore 11, at xi; see also LYONS, supra note 12, at 515-16. 
59 See RYAN, supra nore 13, at 237-38. 
60 See FORDE, supra nore 10, at 11; see also COOGAN, SINCE THE RISING, supra note 11, at 86. 
61 DWYER, supra note 53, at 198; see also COOGAN, SINCE THE RISING, supra note 11, at 86. 
62 COOGAN, SINCE THE RISING, supra nore II, at 86. The Social Code was a compendium of 
Catholic social principles compiled by the Malines International Union of Social Stuedes, a group 
commissioned by Cardinal Mercer in 1920 to study social problems from a Catholic viewpoint. 
Id. 
63WHYTE, supra note 53, at 54. In an early draft of the Constitution, de Valera hailed the 
Catholic church as "a perfect society, having within itself full competence and sovereign authority, 
in respect of the spiritual good of man." DWYER, supra nore 53, at 198. 
64WHYTE, supra note 53, at 52-53. 
65IR. CONST. art. 41 § 3 1 2; see also WHYTE, supra nore 53, at 52. 
66IR. CONST. art. 42 § 3 , 1; see also WHYTE, supra nore 53, at 53. 
67IR. CONST. art. 43 § 2; see also WHYTE, supra note 53, at 53. 
68WHYTE, supra note 53, at 53. Although it has since been repealed, Article 44 originally 
provided: 
The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to Almighty God. 
It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and honor religion. The 
Stare recognizes the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman 
Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens. 
The State also recognizes the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterian Church in 
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De Valera made no attempt to hide his Catholic agenda in a St. 
Patrick's Day address to the United States: "Since the coming of St. 
Patrick 1500 years ago, Ireland has been a Christian and Catholic 
nation, all the ruthless attempts made down through the centuries to 
force her from this allegiance have not shaken her faith. She remains 
a Catholic nation. "69 Because Catholics comprise roughly three-quar-
ters of the population of the entire island,7° there was little resistance 
to the movement to enshrine Catholic principles as the law of the 
land.71 To some, the only surprise was that the 1937 Constitution did 
not formally establish the Catholic Church as the official religion.72 
Although Ireland was and is predominantly Catholic, by enshrin-
ing Catholic values into the law of the land, Irish nationalism created 
a constitution that rewarded the majority by oppressing the minority. 
The 1937 Constitution's Preamble proclaims, 'We, the People of Eire 
humbly acknowledging our obligations to our Divine Lord,Jesus Christ 
who sustained our fathers through centuries of trial ... "73 Clearly, the 
"fathers" sustained through "centuries of trial" referred to Irish Catho-
lics.74 Acknowledging that Ireland's authority emanates directly from 
God rather than the British Crown, on one level, celebrates a realiza-
tion of the historic nationalist dream to achieve independence from 
Great Britain.75 However, on a deeper level, independence from Great 
Britain on nationalist terms equated being Irish with being Catholic.76 
Although this is acceptable to Irish nationalists, it is a notion which 
causes alienation and resentment on behalf of non-Catholic Irish in 
Ireland today.77 As historian G.W. Hogan has observed, de Valera and 
his followers made the mistake of declaring their idea of Irish inde-
pendence without creating a climate for unity within the island: "The 
long oppressed majority was now having its way, and it did not under-
stand the difficulties experienced by members of the minority in ad-
Ireland, the Methodist Church in Ireland, the Religious Society of Friends in 
Ireland, as well as the Jewish Congregations and the other religious denominations 
existing in Ireland at the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution. 
IR. CONST. art. 44. (repealed) (as cited in WHYTE, supra note 53, at 53). 
69 WHYTE, supra note 53, at 48 (quoting radio broadcast). 
70 See e.g., O'MALLEY, supra note 14, at 7. 
71 See WHYTE, supra note 53, at 56-57. 
72 Hogan, supra note 40, at 55. 
73IR. CONST. pmbl. 
74WHYTE, supra note 53, at 48-49. 
75 COOGAN, SINCE THE RISING, supra note 11, at 86. 
76WHYTE, supra note 53, at 48; see also Hogan, supra note 40, at 49. 
77 See Greenway, supra note 17, at 21. 
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justing to the new vision of the Catholic, Gaelic Ireland as proclaimed 
in the Constitution of 1937. "78 
According to de Valera, the purpose of a new Irish Constitution 
was to complete the national revolution of the twenty-six counties from 
British controp9 Ironically, de Valera's lifetime goal was to unite all 
thirty-two counties of Ireland.80 For de Valera and his fellow Irish 
nationalists, to assert the complete independence of only twenty-six 
counties was a thorny issue, because true independence could be 
declared only after all thirty-two counties had been freed from British 
control,81 In drafting the 1937 Constitution, de Valera did not want to 
abandon the nationalist dream of a united Ireland, but could not 
afford to accommodate to that position. His compromise was an expe-
dient one which remains a stumbling block to progress even today.82 
Article 2 of the 1937 Constitution claims for Ireland the territory of 
the six northeastern counties: 'The national territory consists of the 
whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas."83 Article 3 
asserts Ireland'sjurisdiction "over the whole of that territory" although 
"pending the re-integration of the national territory. "84 These two provi-
sions persist today despite Great Britain's control over the six north-
eastern counties of Northern Ireland. 
The 1937 Constitution stresses sovereignty and has a republican 
character; however, nowhere does the word "republic" appear.85 This 
fact underscores both the failure to completely include the six north-
eastern counties within an independent Ireland, and the inconsistency 
of declaring a united Ireland without including both Catholic and 
non-Catholic Irish. As Professor F.S.L. Lyons has suggested, "one rea-
son why the sacred word [republic] did not appear [in the text of the 
1937 Constitution] may well have been precisely because it was so 
sacred .... de Valera had made it clear that for him the ideal was a 
republic of thirty-two not twenty-six counties;" therefore, in Articles 2 
78 Hogan, supra note 40, at 55. 
79RYAN, supra note 13, at 239. "The first, the central and supreme purpose of the entire 
exercise of the new Irish Constitution was to complete the national revolution as far as the 
[twenty-six] counties were concerned." Id. (quoting newspaper interview with de Valera). 
8OBoWMAN, supra note 55, at 6; LYONS, supra note 12, at 515. 
81 LYONS, supra note 12, at 515-16. 
82 See id. at 515-16. Northern unionists had shown little sign of wanting to join the South 
and the declaration of a republic was not likely to make a difference, but the new direction for 
the South had the effect of "locking and barring a door" which was already difficult to open. Id. 
at 516. 
83IR. CONST. art. 2. 
84 IR. CONST. art. 3. 
85 LYONS, supra note 12, at 515. 
1995] NORTHERN IRELAND 97 
and 3 de Valera claimed the territory, pending re-integration.86 More 
specifically, to give the name "republic" to a truncated Ireland would 
betray the martyrs of the 1916 Easter Rising who gave their lives for 
the cause of an independent and Gaelic Ireland.87 According to one 
citizen, ''while securing political stability in the South [de Valera] also 
stabilized the border. "88 
B. The Minority Problem 
By declaring independence in the 1937 Constitution in spite of 
partition, the problems in Irish society which made a physical barrier 
necessary have never been solved. Partition has become not merely an 
issue of territory but also a more fundamental issue of community 
diversity.89 Partition is a national problem involving the people of 
Ireland and can be solved on the basis of m~ority consent alone.90 
Partition has also created partitionism, which is not tied to territory, 
but is an issue of different people peacefully coexisting in a stable 
society.91 
In Ireland, the problem of minority is uniquely complex because 
there is a "double minority:"92 throughout the entire island, Protestants 
make up one-quarter of the Catholic-dominated population,93 but in 
the six northeastern counties of Northern Ireland Protestants outnum-
ber Catholics.94 
As the legacy of partition has grown, religion has taken on a 
broader connotation than one's beliefin God.95 Protestants and Catho-
86 Id. 
87Id. 
88RYAN, supra note 13, at 242. 
89 Id. at 291. 
90 See id.; see also BOWMAN, supra note 55, at 11-25 (discussing the significance of the "map 
symbolism' of partition). 
Id. 
"Map symbolism" is the idea that much of the nationalist's anger with partition is 
that it truncates the island and stands as a symbol of incompleteness. Too often, 
the nationalist worries less about creating a climate for unity and more about 
expressing anger that the British have drawn a line through Ireland and withheld 
part of it. The issue of partition causes anger in nationalists for many reasons, but 
it is fundamentally the symbol of Britain restraining the Irish from being free. 
91 RYAN, supra note 13, at 291. 
92 Claire Palley, Constitutional Solutions to the Irish Problem, 33 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 121, 
127 (1980) [hereinafter Constitutional Solutions]. 
93 E.g., O'MALLEY, supra note 14, at 7. 
94 E.g., COOGAN, IRA, supra note 25, at xvi. Although historically two-thirds Protestant to 
one-third Catholic, Ireland has become fifty-three percent Protestant to forty-one and one-half 
percent Catholic. Id. 
95 See Gerard F. Powers, Testing the Moral Limits of Self-Determination: Northern Ireland and 
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lics in Northern Ireland have become two different communities. The 
Protestant perspective associates "Catholic" with Irish nationalism and 
expresses a fear of cultural absorption in a society dominated by Catho-
lic values.96 The Catholic perspective regards "Protestant" in a political 
rather than religious context.97 Divisions run so deep in Northern 
Ireland that even the trivial events of everyday life exacerbate the 
tension: 
The Nationalists' refusal to rise for the toast of ''The Queen" 
or to stand at the playing of God Save The QJ1,een is highly 
offensive to the Unionists .... To say "Six Counties" instead 
of "Northern Ireland" makes Unionists flare up, and the 
converse is true for Nationalists. The term "non-Catholic" is 
also potentially dangerous ... while in polite circles, the 
Protestant emphasis on Rnman Catholics makes Catholic hack-
les rise. The Unionists point accusingly to the "priest in poli-
tics" whenever a Father So-and-So is seen to be presiding at 
a Nationalist committee meeting-although curiously Nation-
alists don't retort the charge when Protestant clergymen are 
seen walking in [Unionist] processions.98 
The unionist/Protestan t-nationalist/ Catholic division has fostered 
racist attitudes in Northern Ireland.99 Some have suggested that, "re-
duced to its least common denominator . . . the basic problem is 
racism, where the natives of one country believe themselves as innately 
as well as culturally superior to the natives of another, with religion 
being an integral factor in that cultural gap."lOO Northern Protestants 
fear not only discrimination if forced to exist in a Catholic-dominated 
Croatia, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 29, 30-31 (1992); see also DOMINICK]' COYLE, MINORITIES IN 
REVOLT: POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN IRELAND, ITALY, AND CYPRUS 84 (1983). Coyle explains: 
Id. 
[T] here is an essentially religiopolitical conception of the nature of Ulster politics, 
which places the conflict in terms of the battle between two religious systems carried 
on in the field of politics. There is effectively a national-political conception of the 
nature of the conflict. This postulates the Catholic allegiance to a united Ireland 
and the Protestant loyalty to Britain as two rival and irreconcilable national aspira-
tions. 
96 Powers, supra note 95, at 3l. 
97Id. 
98 COOGAN, SINCE THE RISING, supra note II, at 297. 
99 See e.g., MARK]. HURLEY, BLOOD ON THE SHAMROCK: AN AMERICAN PONDERS NORTHERN 
IRELAND: 1968-1990, at 290--92 (1990). Author cites English anti-Irish sentiment even in the 
works of William Shakespeare. See id. 
100Id. at 290. 
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society, but that the "overwhelmingly Catholic ethos of an Irish state 
would threaten their cultural and religious heritage. "101 Conversely, 
Northern Catholics suffer economic disadvantages such as un employ-
ment.102 High unemployment directly relates to the alienation and 
powerlessness that prompts many Northern Catholics to pursue vio-
lence as a means of improving their position.lo3 Some have gone so far 
as to compare the repressive condition of Catholics in Northern Ire-
land with the former apartheid regime of South Mrica.104 
Clearly, Ireland is "not a well nation," and suffers from a severe 
identity crisis. lo5 Colonialism is targeted as the root ofIreland's identity 
problem: "Everyone in this country is subject in greater or lesser 
degree to the apathy, helplessness and loss of autonomy born of op-
pression."106 Just as a sense of self-identity is crucial for an individual's 
self-realization, it is similarly vital to the self-identity of a nation.107 To 
some extent, Ireland continues to struggle to define itself politically 
because it cannot define itself as a people: 
[F] or few peoples was colonisation such a profoundly destruc-
tive historical experience as it was for the Irish, obliterating 
our own civilisation and its institutions, uprooting us from the 
land and leaving us communicating with each other through 
the language of the coloniser .... Our past as a nation has 
been so crushing and so painful that we are too inclined to 
rush blindly ahead and leave it behind us. The fact is, that we 
cannot go ahead [until we know] where we have been.108 
It is crucial to recognize that this alienation moved the "long op-
pressed majority" of Irish nationalists to use the "language of the 
colonizer" in creating a Constitution that claimed to provide for the 
entire island but asserted the beliefs of Catholics against all other 
groups in society.109 
Ideally, constitutional law is a means to establish a cohesive society 
that protects the individual. llo In outlining the structure of the organs 
101 Powers, supra note 95, at 33. 
102 E.g., Palley, Constitutional Solutions, supra note 92, at 127-28. 
103 See Powers, supra note 95, at 32-33. 
104 See Harvey, supra note 44, at 170. 
105 PEA DAR KIRBY, HAS IRELAND A FUTURE 44-45 (1988). 
106Id. 
107Id. 
108Id. 
109 See id. 
110 See MORGAN, supra note 56, at 11. 
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of the state, a constitution establishes the distribution of power within 
a society.lll During this process a kind of majority tyranny can take 
place when "groups with the greatest force and the will to deploy it ... 
[determine] what law can be enforced or remain law and sometimes 
[decide] what new law will be."1l2 In a deeply divided society such as 
Ireland, those groups who have lost in the power struggle to establish 
the state consider the resulting constitutional arrangements illegiti-
mate and without authority.ll3 To non-Catholic Irish, the 1937 Consti-
tution is merely a power map which reflects the triumph of Catholi-
cism.114 When minority groups feel alienated by the law, they consider 
themselves morally free to disobey the law because it is imposed upon 
them and does not represent their beliefs.115 Ideally, constitutions can 
Id. 
III E.g., Palley, Constitutional Solutions, supra note 92, at 124. 
112Id. at 125-26. 
I!3 See id. at 125. Palley explains: 
In a deeply divided society, such as Northern Ireland, those groups who have lost 
in the power struggle preceding the establishment or perpetuation of a state see 
things otherwise. They see the state and its constitutional arrangements as being 
imposed, illegitimate, and without authority, and themselves as morally free to 
disobey state commands. They do see the Constitution as a power map, but as a 
map reflecting in a mirror the outcome of historical power struggles. They also see 
the constitutional arrangements as devices to maintain the dominance of those who 
have thus far won the political battle. 
When such perceptions are widespread, the state and its constitutional arrange-
ments are threatened ana struggles about its continuance are likely. 
114 See id. 
115 Id. Floyd G. Cullop explains how the United States Constitution has avoided such minority 
alienation: 
Seeing that our government operates in the best interests of all the people of the 
United States is the responsibility of all citizens. We must accept this responsibility 
to remain a free people and to enjoy the type of government our Constitution 
enables us to have. 
Obviously, even in a democratic republic, everyone cannot be satisfied all the 
time. Our government is based upon the idea that it should be able to do the most 
good for the most people most of the time-not that it can always please everybody. 
Common sense tells us this would be an impossible task . 
. . . Unless a candidate is elected by a unanimous [vote]' there must be a minority 
of voters who are not satisfied with the results of the election. 
This does not mean that the minority did not have a voice in government. Even 
though it did not vote for him, the newly elected official is the minority's repre-
sentative in government, the same as he is the representative of the majority who 
did vote for him. 
A person whose candidate loses must wait until the next election before he may 
have another chance to try to elect a candidate of his choice to the office. In the 
meantime, it is his duty as a good citizen to accept the wishes of the majority of the 
voters and cooperate with them. Being a good loser is as important to our democratic 
republic as being well informed and interested in all activities of government. 
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prevent such power struggles within a diverse society. Constitutional 
law can provide conflict avoiding mechanisms by establishing institu-
tions to ensure equality and fair treatment of all citizens.1I6 
III. THE PRESENT 
A. Diplomatic Attempts at a Solution 
In the past two decades, both the Irish and British governments 
have attempted to solve the problems of Northern Ireland through 
diplomacy. In 1985, the Anglo-Irish Agreement renewed hope for a 
solution to the Northern Ireland crisis. The Agreement was signed on 
November 15,1985 at Hillsborough, County Down (Northern Ireland) 
by Garrett FitzGerald, Prime Minister of Ireland and Margaret Thatcher, 
Prime Minister of Great Britain.ll7 The most significant development 
of the Agreement was the establishment of an Intergovernmental Con-
ference between Britain and Ireland through which the Government 
of Ireland could advance views and proposals on matters of govern-
ment and administration of Northern Ireland. lIS Article 1 ofthe Agree-
ment reads: 
FLOYD G. CULLOP, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION 13-14 (Men-
tor updated ed. 1984) (emphasis added). 
116Palley, Constitutional Solutions, supra note 92, at 139. 
117ToM HADDEN & KEVIN BoYLE, THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT: COMMENTARY, TEXT AND 
OFFICIAL REVIEW 1 (1989). 
118Id. at 22-24. Article 2 of the Agreement provides: 
(a) There is hereby established, within the framework of the Anglo-Irish Intergov-
ernmental Council set up after the meeting between the two Heads of Government 
on 6 November 1981, an Intergovernmental Conference (hereinafter referred to 
as "the Conference") concerned with Northern Ireland and with relations between 
the two parts of the island of Ireland, to deal, as set out in this Agreement, on a 
regular basis with 
(i) political matters; 
(ii) security and related matters; 
(iii) legal matters, including the administration of justice; 
(iv) the promotion of cross-border co-operation. 
(b) The United Kingdom Government accepts that the Irish Government will put 
forward views and proposals on matters relating to Northern Ireland within the 
field of activity of the Conference in so far as those matters are not the responsibility 
of a devolved administration in Northern Ireland. In the interests of promoting 
peace and stability, determined efforts shall be made through the Conference to 
resolve any differences. The Conference will be mainly concerned with Northern 
Ireland; but some of the matters under consideration will involve co-<>perative 
action in both parts of Ireland, and possibly also in Great Britain. Some of the 
proposals considered in respect of Northern Ireland may also be found to have 
application by the Irish Government. There is no derogation from the sovereignty 
of either the United Kingdom Government or the Irish Government, and each 
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The two Governments 
(a) affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland 
would only come about with the consent of a majority of the 
people of Northern Ireland; 
(b) recognise that the present wish of a majority of the 
people of Northern Ireland is for no change in the status of 
Northern Ireland; 
(c) declare that, if in the future a majority of the people of 
Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally consent to the 
establishment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and 
support in the respective Parliaments legislation to give effect 
to that wish.n9 
At the time of its adoption, the 1985 Agreement was the "most 
significant and carefully prepared development in the relationship 
between Britain and Ireland since the partition settlement in the 1920s."120 
Both sides carefully worded the document to avoid dispute over the 
definition of the status of Northern Ireland:121 "[I]n part by necessity, 
surely at times by intention, the document was shaped to be excruci-
atingly vague, a precise formulation of uncertainties and possibilities 
as much as a hard-edged blueprint of the future. "122 Other historians 
note: "The intention [of the Agreement] was to reassure Unionists that 
their right to remain in the United Kingdom ... was formally recog-
nized by the Irish Government, while at the same time assuring Na-
tionalists that if they secured the consent of the Unionists for a united 
Ireland the British Government would implement it."123 
The Agreement was important because it allowed a foreign nation, 
Ireland, a voice in the internal affairs of a sovereign country.124 Some 
interpreted this as an admission by the British that partition had been 
a political and social failure. 125 The real significance of the 1985 Agree-
retains responsibility for the decisions and administration of government within its 
own jurisdiction. 
Id. (reprinting text of agreement). This is the British version; in the Irish version precedence is 
given to the Irish Government. 
119Id. at 18. 
120Id. at 1. 
121Id. at 18. 
122]. BOWYER BELL, THE IRISH TROUBLES: A GENERATION OF VIOLENCE: 1967-1992, at 704 
(1993). 
123HADDEN & BOYLE, supra note 117, at 18. 
124Kevin G. Kenneally, Note, Nurthem Ireland: Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1985-Protestant opposi-
tion to Political Representation for the Catholic Minority: The Apartheid of the United Kingdom, 10 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 425, 425 (1986). 
1250'MALLEY, supra note 14, at 424-25. 
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ment, however, lay more in spirit than in details.126 The Agreement can 
be credited for enabling more recent progress because it set in motion 
a process for a constitutional solution to the ethnic conflict.127 For the 
first time, the two Governments sought to transcend the zero-sum 
negotiation between unionist/Protestant and nationalist/Catholic. 128 
Essentially, the document was aspiration aI, calling for co-operation 
without compulsion.129 
The increased communication between Ireland and Great Britain 
provided the opportunity for further diplomacy in 1993. On December 
15, 1993, Prime Ministers Albert Reynolds of Ireland and John Major 
of Great Britain announced a joint declaration of principles for peace 
in Northern Ireland which Major dubbed "The Downing Street Decla-
ration. "130 The agreement resulted from two years of diplomacy and 
weeks of intensive negotiations aimed at bringing an end to the vio-
lence in Northern Ireland.131 The Declaration reassures Unionists that 
no change will take place in Northern Ireland without the support of 
a majority of its citizens. 132 It also includes an agreement by Ireland to 
consider dropping Articles 2 and 3, although only as part of an overall 
settlement. 133 The significant new development of the Declaration is its 
invitation to Sinn Feinl34 to participate in negotiations if Sinn Fein's 
counterpart, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), renounces its violent 
tactics. 13s 
126JJ. LEE, IRELAND 1912-1985: POLITICS AND SOCIETY 686 (1989). 
127 Paul Arthur, Initiatives for Consensus: Minority Perceptions, in CONSENSUS IN IRELAND: 
ApPROACHES AND RECESSIONS 59-60 (Charles Townshend ed., 1988). 
128LEE, supra note 126, at 683. 
129 See BELL, supra note 122, at 707-08. 
130William Miller, British-Irish Declaration Offers Step to Ulster Peace, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 
1993, at 1, 35. 
In many areas, the seven-page declaration is a restatement of principles outlined in 
the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, which gave the Irish government a consultative 
role in the governing of Northern Ireland in exchange for accepting that Northern 
Ireland's constitutional status would not change until a majority living there said 
otherwise. 
Kevin Cullen, Does Accord Have Potential? All Eyes Turn to Republicans, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 
1993, at 35. 
131 Miller, supra note 130, at 1, 35. 
132Id. 
133Id. 
134 Sinn Fein, meaning "ourselves alone," is the radical nationalist political group comprised 
of Catholics in Northern Ireland. Sinn Fein is well-known for its ties to the Irish Republican Army. 
For a history of Sinn Fein, see COOGAN, IRA, supra note 25, at 33-39. 
135John Darnton, British-Irish Pact Gives I.R.A. Allies Terms for Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 
1993, at AI, A8. Clearly, the aim of the declaration is to induce negotiation rather than violence: 
"[T]he declaration seeks to convince the IRA that it can achieve more at the bargaining table 
through the democratic process than with the violent campaign that has caused so much hardship 
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The Declaration advanced the process of peace even closer to a 
political settlement.136 Both the British and the Irish acknowledged 
their roles and responsibility in effecting the 1985 Agreement's theme 
of unity by consent.137 The British acknowledged that there can be no 
change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of a 
majority of the citizens of Northern Ireland.138 The Irish position em-
phasized the importance of the consent of the people of Northern 
Ireland and a willingness to refrain from asserting a claim to territory 
without the support of the people residing within that territory.139 
Offering inclusion in the peace process to Sinn Fein, the political 
wing of the IRA, distinguished the 1993 Declaration.14o In addition, the 
Declaration reflected the current reality that Northern Ireland has lost 
its strategic and economic value to the British.141 This fact gave Prime 
Minister Major considerable political leverage to create some solution 
to the problems of Northern Ireland.142 Nonetheless, the Downing 
.... Both governments believe that if the IRA ceases fire, loyalist paramilitary groups will follow, 
and dialogue and powersharing could flourish." Cullen, Does Accord Have Potential? AU Eyes Tum 
to Republicans, supra note 130, at 35. 
136Darnton, supra note 135, at A9 (quoting excerpts of Joint Declaration issued by Prime 
Minister John Major of Great Britain and Prime Minister Albert Reynolds of Ireland at Downing 
Street, London, December 15, 1993). 
137Id. 
138Id. 
139Id. 
140Id. 
141 See id; see also Palley, Constitutional Solutions, supra note 92, at 122. 
The document makes a telling distinction between "them"-all the Irish people-
and ''us"-the British. To unionists, who cling almost desperately to their British 
identity, that more than anything signals the long-term intentions of their political 
masters. No British government has ever gone as far in acknowledging the right of 
the Irish people to determine their future free from British interference. 
Emily O'Reilly, Now, AU Eyes Are on Sinn Fein and the IRA, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17, 1993, at 27 
(editorial). 
Although Britain's acknowledgement is a new development, it is one which has gradually become 
an accepted fact: "[T]he [Downing Street] declaration also reiterated a statement made last year 
by Northern Ireland Secretary Sir Patrick Mayhew that Britain had no selfish, strategic or 
economic interest in remaining in Northern Ireland." Cullen, Does Accord Have Potential? AU 
Eyes Tum to the Republicans, supra note 130, at 35. In addition, Irish Prime Minister Albert 
Reynolds went as far as to say, "British imperialist interest in Ireland is dead, even if we still have 
to resolve some of its legacy." Andrew Hill, Dublin Sees Pact Ending Colonialism, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Jan. 11, 1994, at 2. 
142Thomas Oliphant, A Wonder in Northern Ireland, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. I, 1993, at 19 
(editorial). 
It's not hard to understand why [Major wants to forge a resolution in Northern 
Ireland]. The status quo in Northern Ireland means the indefinite stationing of 
17,000 troops there to operate the functional equivalent of a police state; it means 
$3 billion every year in costs; and it means a constant siege mentality in the British 
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Street Declaration is a marked change in policy by Major, who in the 
past had refused to bargain with any group that used violence. 143 
Unionists feel abandoned by these policy maneuvers and many no 
longer trust Prime Minister Major,144 who admitted secret contacts 
between his government and the IRA after months of denying rumors 
of such meetings. 145 Northern Protestants contend that Major's policy 
rewards the IRA for its violent tactics. 146 Hence, there has been a 
predictable increase in loyalist paramilitary violence and support for 
such groups, on behalf of those Unionists who feel that violence is the 
most effective way of protecting one's interests. 147 For the first time, the 
upper and middle class unionists are beginning to actively support 
paramilitaries.148 Unionist paramilitaries are exploiting unionists' sense 
Id. 
Isles as IRA terrorism goes on indefinitely. The words "albatross" and "quagmire" 
are being heard more and more. 
143 See Kevin Cullen, When Talks Are Taken as Treason, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1993, at 2. 
It is important to distinguish that Major's invitation was not a direct one to the IRA, but to Sinn 
Fein, the political party associated with the violent paramilitary group. Darnton, supra note 135, 
at AI, AS. 
144 See Kevin Helliker, Troubles Aplenty: In Northern Ireland, The Bloodiest Hands Are Often 
Protestant, WALL ST.]., Dec. 16, 1993, at AI, A9. Extreme unionist leader Rev. Ian Paisley was so 
offended by the revelation of Major's contact with the IRA that his verbal assault on Major 
charging those involved with "falsehoods and lies" was vicious enough to earn him suspension 
from the House of Commons. Paisley later denounced the Downing Street Declaration by 
declaring: "You have sold Ulster to buy off the fiendish Republican scum." Id. 
145 William Miller, Briton, in Parliament, Defends IRA Talks: Calls Peace "Prize Worth Risks," 
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1993 at 2. See also Kevin Cullen, When Talks are Taken as Treason, supra 
note 143, at 2. 
Id. 
To most people the notion of the British government secretly talking to its sworn 
enemy, the Irish Republican Army, to end the bloody stalemate in Northern Ireland 
would seem logical. 
Mter all, Israel and the PLO talk. Bosnian Serbs and Muslims talk-iffor no other 
reason than to try to halt the killing. 
Moreover, Mr. Major insisted that the channel of communication between his government and 
the IRA had been "extremely reliable over many years." William Miller, Major Tells Goals in IRA 
Link, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1993, at 2. 
146 Kevin Cullen, As Some in Ulster Talk of Peace, Others See Abandonment, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Dec. 7, 1992, at 12. 
Id. 
While many people in Northern Ireland hope for peace, a sense of abandonment 
among poor Protestants is fueling the backlash, supplying paramilitaries with re-
cruits and providing financial support from people who, in the past, had wanted 
nothing to do with violence .... The sad reality is people here feel so abandoned 
that the paramilitaries are able to exploit that, saying, 'Look what the Catholics got 
by what the IRA has done.' 
147 Helliker, supra note 144, at A9. 
148 See id. 
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of abandonment and powerlessness by citing what the IRA has gained 
through violence.149 As the IRA captured the attention of the media 
for so long, new interest has been sparked in the loyalist paramilitaries, 
which some predict will further reinforce the belief that violence pays.150 
However, most credit Major's courage to take whatever steps are 
necessary for peace in the region. 151 Major's success is due in some 
degree to his considerable political leverage in trying to bring about 
some resolution in Ireland. 152 The recession facing his government 
would clearly be aided by some solution, which could enable it to cease 
maintaining an expensive military presence in Northern Ireland and 
continually repairing damage done by IRA bombs.153 In addition, only 
1.5 million of Major's sixty million constituents live in Northern Ire-
land, and the large majority of his constituents care little about the 
region.154 Change can only hurt Major with the Unionists of Northern 
Ireland, a group that lacks political influence, as one observer noted: 
"there is no downside risk" to change in Northern Ireland.155 
Mter asking for "clarification" of the Downing Street Declara-
tion,156 the IRA on August 31, 1994 declared that "it had reached a 
'historic crossroads' and called an unconditional cease-fire. "157 Predict-
149 See Cullen, As Some in Ulster Talk of Peace, Protestants See Abandonment, supra note 146, 
at 12. 
150 See Helliker, supra note 144, at A9. 
151 See Bridging the Irish Chasm, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1993, at 18. It is also important to 
note the degree to which developments in Northern Ireland are due to Prime Minister Major'S 
willingness to find a solution, unlike his predecessor: 
Obviously, the principal obstacle has been the IRA's terrorism. It is now clear, 
however, that another major obstacle was Margaret Thatcher. For more than a 
decade she hid her Unionist prejudice behind an implacable position that no 
change in Northern Ireland's status was possible without the assent of a majority of 
the region's people. By refusing to negotiate in good faith, she ensured that the 
only choice available was the non choice of the extremes: either union with Ireland 
or continued association with Britain. 
John Major is different. 
Oliphant, supra note 142, at 19. 
152 Helliker, supra note 144 at AI, A9. 
153Id. One IRA bomb which exploded in London's business district caused an estimated $1.5 
billion damage. Id. 
154Id. 
155Id. With such strong incentive for some change in the region, it is also easy to understand 
why the Unionists fear abandonment. Kevin Cullen, As Some in Ulster Talk of Peace, Protestants 
See Abandonment, note 146, at 12. 
156 Andrew Hill, Dublin Sees Pact Ending Colonialism, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11, 1994, at 2. 
157 Kevin Cullen, N. Ireland at a 'Crossroads:' IRA Calls Cease-Fire but Governments are at Odds 
Over Wording, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1,1994, at 1. The following is the IRA's Cease-Fire Statement: 
Recognizing the potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the 
democratic process and underlying our definitive commitment to its success, the 
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ably, the announcement was greeted with enthusiasm from many, in-
cluding President Clinton.158 However, the announcement was more 
coolly received by Prime Minister Major, who urged the IRA to declare 
that its cease-fire will be permanent. 159 In keeping with the Downing 
Street Declaration's promise to bargain with Sinn Fein should the IRA 
cease its violence, Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds has announced 
that the Irish government will host a "forum on peace and reconcili-
ation" including Sinn Fein.160 This is a dramatic step which marks the 
Sinn Fein's "entry into the political mainstream" from which it has 
historically been excluded due to its ties to the IRA. 161 
B. The Stumbling Blocks 
Although current events in Northern Ireland are encouraging, 
difficult challenges lay ahead. As each diplomatic effort has shown, the 
two fundamental issues that must be resolved to create a lasting peace 
are the same issues that were overlooked in 1937: the 1937 Constitu-
tion's Articles 2 and 3 claim to the territory of the North, and the 
leadership of the IRA have decided that as of midnight Aug. 31, there will be a 
complete cessation of military operations. All our units have been instructed ac-
cordingly. 
At this historic crossroads the leadership of the IRA salutes and commends our 
volunteers, other activists, our supporters and the political prisoners who have 
sustained the struggle against all odds for the past 25 years. 
Your courage, determination and sacrifice have demonstrated that the freedom 
and the desire for peace based on ajust and lasting settlement cannot be crushed. 
We remember all those who have died for Irish freedom and we reiterate our 
commitment to our republican objectives. 
Our struggle has seen many gains and advances made by nationalists and for the 
democratic position. We believe that an opportunity to secure a just and lasting 
settlement has been created. 
We are therefore entering into a new situation in a spirit of determination and 
confidence determined that the injustices which created this conflict will be re-
moved and confident in the strength and justice of our struggle to achieve this. We 
note that the Downing Street Declaration is not a solution nor was it presented as 
such by its authors. 
A solution will only be found as a result of conclusive negotiations. Others, not 
least the British government, have a duty to face up to their responsibilities. 
In our desire to significantly contribute to the creation of a climate which will 
encourage this, we urge everybody to approach this new situation with determina-
tion and patience. 
IRA Cease-Fire Statement, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1, 1994, at 27. 
158 Cullen, Northern Ireland at 'Crossroads', supra note 157, at l. 
159Id. 
160 Kevin Cullen, 3 Leaders of Irish Vow to Bury Past. British, Ulster's Protestants Are Urged to 
Search for Peace, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 7, 1994 at 1, 15. 
161 See id. at 15. 
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commitment by the British to the people of the North that no change 
will take place until a majority of the people of the North so consent. 
In many ways, these two stumbling blocks reveal the fundamental 
tensions which made partition necessary and have perpetuated the 
conflict for the past twenty-five years. 
1. Articles 2 and 3 
It is the implicit claim of a right of this twenty-six-county 
Parliament and Government to exercise jurisdictions over the 
whole ofIreland, including Northern Ireland, that represents 
such a stumbling block to progress towards Irish unity be-
cause it sticks in the throat of every Northern Unionist and 
gives power to their more extreme leaders to compete in 
demagoguery as they rant against this claim. 
Statement of Garrett FitzGerald, former Prime Minister of 
Ireland. 162 
Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 Constitution provide: 
Article 2: The national territory consists of the whole island 
of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas. 
Article 3: Pending the re-integration of the national territory, 
and without prejudice to the right of the Parliament and 
Government established by this Constitution to exercise juris-
diction over the whole of that territory, the laws enacted by 
that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of appli-
cation as the laws of Saorstat Eireann and the like extra-ter-
ritorial effect.163 
By claiming the entire island as "the nation," the 1937 document 
seems to ignore the fact of partition.164 However, the phrase "pending 
the re-integration of the national territory" recognizes the existence of 
partition and articulates the aspiration of the southern community to 
encompass the northern counties as well.165 Given the tension between 
the South breaking away from Britain and in a sense leaving the North 
behind, Articles 2 and 3 seem paradoxical and contradictory.166 Yet they 
reflect the tension de Valera felt in realizing the nationalist goal of 
162 O'MALLEY, supra note 14, at 32. 
163IR. CONST. arts. 2-3. Saorstat Eireann is the Irish name for Irish Free State (Ireland before 
1922). 
164 E.g., CASEY, supra note 30, at 31. 
165Id. 
166 See FORDE, supra note 10, at 50-53. 
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establishing an independent and separate unit, without giving up the 
nationalist claim to later include the Northern counties.167 
It is no accident that Articles 2 and 3 are often cited by both sides 
of the partition dispute as barriers to compromise. At the time of their 
implementation, some believed that by drafting the two articles so 
strongly, de Valera could stir up the entire partition issue and force a 
resolution.168 Most feel that Articles 2 and 3 prevent unity-especially 
Northern unionists, who repeatedly suggest dropping the two articles 
as a first step toward a potential united Ireland.169 Nationalists view the 
articles, however, as a constitutional reinforcement of the historic Irish 
claim to an independent and united island.170 
Much of the debate over Articles 2 and 3 concerns whether the 
articles represent a legitimate legal claim by the Irish government or 
merely articulate a political aspiration. For a time, those who consid-
ered Articles 2 and 3 to be political aspiration seemed to possess the 
controlling interpretation. l7l Delivering a lecture on the topic, Irish 
Supreme Court Justice Kenny cited a 1975 Irish Supreme Court deci-
sion interpreting the articles as aspiration without legal significance: 
[T] he Constitution ... expresses not only legal norms but 
basic doctrines of social and political theory .... [T] he Con-
stitution contains more than legal rules: it reflects, in part, 
aspirations and aims and expresses the political theories on 
which the people acted when they enacted the Constitution .... 
This national claim to unity exists not in the legal but in the 
1· . al d 172 po IUC or er .... 
The Irish Supreme Court rejected this interpretation in the 1990 
case of McGimpsey & McGimpsey v. Ireland,173 which involved the legal-
ity of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1985.174 Chief Justice Finlay found the 
Treaty to be constitutional and interpreted Articles 2 and 3 as claims 
of legal right and not political aspirations.175 The plaintiffs were two 
members of the Official Unionist Party of Northern Ireland.176 Both 
167 See BOWMAN, supra note 55, at 323. 
168 Id. at 148. 
169 See O'MALLEY, supra note 14, at 32. 
170 See Harvey, supra note 44, at 171-72 (arguing that the "Irish nation has always denied the 
legality of the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922, which was imposed upon them by the British threat of 
'immediate and terrible war'"). 
17l CASEY, supra note 30, at 3l. 
172Id. (quoting from Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill 1975, 1977 I.R. 129). 
173McGimpseyv. Ireland [1990], 11.R. 110, 119. 
174 See id. at 113. 
175 See id. at 119. 
176Id. at 113. As Unionists, the two resented the recognition that Ireland should have a voice 
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were unhappy with the 1985 Anglo-Irish Treaty because it officially gave 
the government of Ireland a role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. I77 
They attempted to nullify the Treaty by attacking its constitutionality 
in light of Articles 2 and 3.178 The plaintiffs argued that the Treaty was 
unconstitutional because it recognized the validity of partition, there-
fore directly challenging the constitutional claim to jurisdiction over 
the entire island. I79 This argument required the Court to decide the 
status of the Articles. During argument, both parties adopted the 
interpretation that the two articles represented claims of legal right 
and that Article 3 provided that the government of the twenty-six 
counties could enact laws covering Northern Ireland pending the 
re-integration of the national territory.I80 
Chief Justice Finlay decided that despite the fact of partition, the 
articles convey a valid legal claim.I81 The judge explained: 
With Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution should be read the 
preamble, and I am satisfied that the true interpretation of 
these constitutional provisions is as follows: 
1. The re-integration of the national territory is a constitu-
tional imperative .... 
2. Article 2 of the Constitution consists of a declaration of the 
extent of the national territory as a claim of legal right. 
3. Article 3 of the Constitution prohibits, pending the re-in-
tegration of the national territory, the enactment oflaws with 
any greater area or extent of application or extra-territorial 
effects than the laws of Saorstat Eireann and this prohibits 
the enactment oflaws applicable in the counties of Northern 
Ireland. 
4. The restriction imposed by Article 3 pending the re-inte-
gration of the national territory in no way derogates from the 
claim as a legal right to the entire territory.I82 
The Articles are central to the Northern Ireland problem because 
they are de Valera's articulation of the nationalist desire to break away 
in the affairs of Northern Ireland. Their resentment was grounded in the fear of oppression of 
a Catholic moral code which would inevitably destroy Protestant culture and traditions. Id. The 
Official Unionist Party is "the branch of the traditional Unionists in Ireland that ... is descended 
from the Party formed during the years of the Union of Britain and Ireland. The group advocates 
continuance of the British connection with Ireland." RYAN, supra note 13, at 400. 
177 See McGimpsey, 1 I.R. at 113. 
178Id. 
179 See id. 
180 See id; see also HADDEN & BOYLE, supra note 117, at 19-20. 
181 McGimpsey, 1 I.R. at 119. 
182Id. (citation omitted). 
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from Britain without completely abandoning claims to the North.183 
However, many Northerners resent this claim because they fear oppres-
sion and exploitation in a Catholic-dominated community.184 Despite 
the controversy, the Articles remain in the Constitution, with the legal 
endorsement of the McGimpsey decision, as a significant roadblock on 
the path to a solution of the Northern Ireland problem. 
2. Unity by Consent 
The real root of the problem is the guarantee, the flat-footed, 
unremitting guarantee, which the British Government ex-
tends to the Unionist section of the population of Northern 
Ireland .... I want to, if I can at all, to the British Govern-
ment and the British public, identify that, isolate that, as the 
stumbling block, the great, big, immovable object .... 
Charles Haughey, former Prime Minister of Ireland.185 
Like Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 Constitution, the concept of unity 
by consent is a basic issue which is repeatedly raised in discussions of 
possible resolutions to the Northern Ireland problem.186 It is the guar-
antee of the British government to the people of Northern Ireland that 
no change will take place regarding the status of Northern Ireland 
(particularly, union with the South) without their consent.187 Unity by 
consent was suggested at the time of de Valera and the struggle of the 
South for independence.188 For de Valera, however, unity by consent 
was a concept that conflicted with his nationalist ideals. 189 As a nation-
alist whose lifetime goal was the union of the entire island, de Valera 
could not afford the six northern counties the right of unity by con-
sent, because doing so would grant them the corresponding right to 
opt out of any union.190 To give the North the right to secede from his 
nationalist dream of uniting the entire island would have betrayed the 
historic nationalist dream of an independent and Gaelic Ireland, and 
would have offended his own personal convictions.191 
On a different level, unity by consent is designed to allay Protes-
tant fears of becoming an oppressed minority in a Catholic-dominated 
183 See LYONS, supra note 12, at 515-16. 
184 Powers, supra note 95, at 33. 
185 RYAN, supra note 13, at 286 (quoting from television interview). 
186 See id. at 293. 
187Id. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. 
190 See id. 
191 LYONS, supra note 12, at 515-16. 
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society. The need for such minority protection highlights the tenuous 
situation of Northern Irish Unionists, who have in some ways become 
neither Irish nor British.192 While Unionists clearly do not want to be 
part of a Catholic state, it is not always clear that they are accepted as 
British.l93 The admission by Great Britain that it no longer has a 
strategic interest in Northern Ireland,194 its conditional invitation to 
bargain with Sinn Fein,195 and the mounting expense of maintaining 
British presence has given Unionists reason to fear being abandoned.196 
Therefore, unity by consent is often used by unionists to stall progress, 
in order to prevent any change that does not benefit their interests.197 
As nationalists have been blamed for putting Catholic supremacy above 
a peaceful and united Ireland, so have unionists been accused of 
abusing unity by consent to impede progress for fear of losing their 
majority statuS.198 
Some have gone so far as to argue that the British must withdraw . 
immediately from Northern Ireland and should not remain in North-
ern Ireland only out of fear of "loyalist backlash. "199 Comparisons have 
even been made to school desegregation in the United States: "If 
President Eisenhower hadn't stood up to the bullies in Little Rock, 
Arkansas, the blacks would still be sitting or standing in the back of 
America's buses."200 However, it must be remembered that the reason 
for unity by consent is the fundamental alienation of Northern union-
ists, who fear oppression by a Catholic Ireland and abandonment by 
Great Britain.201 Therefore, the need for such an assurance must be 
removed before the assurance itself is no longer necessary. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite the laudable efforts of both Ireland and Great Britain, the 
problems of Northern Ireland remain. Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 
Constitution and the concept of unity by consent are continually brought 
up in diplomacy, yet neither will solve Ireland's problems because they 
192 Greenway, supra note 17, at 21. 
1930'MALLEY, supra note 14, at 138-39. 
194Darnton, supra note 135, at AI, A8. 
195Helliker, supra note 144, at AI, A8. 
196 Kevin Cullen, As Some in Ulster Talk of Peace, Protestants See Abandonment, supra note 146, 
at 12. 
197 See BELL, supra note 122, at 706. 
198 See Kenneally, supra note 124, at 437. 
199TIM P. COOGAN, DISILLUSIONED DECADES: IRELAND 1966-1987, at 241 (1987). 
200 BEW & GILLESPIE, supra note 9, at 78, 84. 
201 See O'MALLEY, supra note 14, at 138-39. 
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are both merely the manifestation of Ireland's historical inability to 
protect minorities. What is needed in Ireland is a constitutional frame-
work which vigorously protects individual rights without regard to 
religion. 
For too long, Ireland has suffered from an historical cycle of 
oppression. The historic dream of a free and independent Gaelic 
Ireland can never be realized because it does not apply to all people 
in Ireland. The 1937 Constitution did not create a united Ireland 
because it alienated those Irish in the North who are not Catholic. By 
inflexibly claiming the territory of the North without regard to its 
people, the 1937 Constitution continues to reinforce Unionists' fears 
of submergence and oppression within a Catholic society. Articles 2 
and 3 must be removed or at least rewritten to recognize that no claim 
to territory can be made without the consent of the citizens of that 
territory. 
The more difficult obstacle to creating a lasting peace in Northern 
Ireland is creating a society that Unionists would consent to join. Irish 
Catholics have enshrined their own values without considering the 
effects on the minority population in Ireland. Constitutional law is the 
key for Ireland to create a stable and cohesive society of diverse tradi-
tions. By enshrining Catholicism, the 1937 Constitution does more 
than alienate non-Catholics. It perpetuates the cycle of oppression 
against the minority. Rather than repeat the mistakes of the past, 
Ireland must create a new society that recognizes the equal rights of 
all groups. Constitutional law can achieve this by providing a power 
structure that treats all groups equally and is not merely a power map 
reflecting the group that presently wields the most power. Although 
Article 44 has already been amended to remove the superiority of the 
Catholic church, Catholic influence remains in Articles 41-44. These 
are important articles because they define individual rights. The fun-
damental fear of Unionists is that they will be oppressed in a Catholic 
Irish society that will not protect their individual rights. Removing 
Catholic values and aggressively protecting individual rights would 
finally enable the Irish to break the historical pattern of oppression 
and create a constitutional framework for a diverse society. In addition, 
the Irish must vigorously assert individual rights, which would be guar-
anteed by an equal protection clause, a due process clause, and a clause 
against government takings of property. 
The Irish must realize that the dreams of the past do not apply to 
today's Ireland. A society must be created with equality for all citizens 
that reflects the modern diversity of Ireland. The problems of the past 
will persist until Ireland decides to create its own peaceful future. 

